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Introduction 
We thank the commentator (Chowdhury 2010) for recognising the contribution of our study, and 
providing specific recommendations for our research. In this response, the authors elucidate 
issues raised, and in doing, reproduce the results incorporating the commentator’s suggestions. 
We recognise Chowdhury has an economic discipline’s perspective on the accounting study, and 
argue that the contextual factors discussed in his reply do not necessarily impair the outcome of 
the Rashid et al. (2010) paper.  
 
Points of Clarification  
Focus of the Paper  
Chowdhury (2010) identifies the results of Rashid et al. (2010) as complementing the findings of 
Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007), that the age and size of the board of directors do not have 
significant impact on corporate governance disclosures. However, the authors clarify that a 
comparison of the findings cannot be drawn, because the focus of our research is examining a 
different aspect. Rather than examining the impact of governance attributes on disclosure, 
Rashid et al. (2010) examine the effect of board composition on firm performance.  
 
Limitation of Literature Review  
Chowdhury (2010), in acknowledging the comprehensive nature of the literature review, 
suggests that inclusion of studies on South Asian countries would improve the contribution of the 
study. The authors concur. Regrettably, there is a dearth of published empirical studies on the 
impact of corporate governance on firm performance in South Asia in general, and specifically 
on the impact of corporate board composition and its effects on firm performance. Our research 
did not discover any directly comparable literature for South Asia. However, there are limited 
more general studies such as Shah, Zafar and Durrani (2009), who investigate the earnings 
management motives of independent directors in Pakistan. This is recognised as an area for 
further research.  
 
Sample Size 
 
The authors thank the commentator for his observation in his first footnote, of inconsistent 
terminology regarding sample size. We confirm that the sample size on page 77 of our paper 
should be 274 firm-years, consistent with page 76 and Table 1 on page 83.  
 
The Model: Theoretical Underpinnings. 
Rashid et al. (2010) make reference to established research on board composition and firm 
performance, premised on the tenets of agency theory. These studies provide theoretical 
justification for the explanators of the model used in our study that targets the Bangladeshi 
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context. In this respect we refute the allegation our model is ad hoc with no theoretical 
underpinnings. 
 
The Model: Discussion of Variables  
Chowdhury (2010) argues that the regression model of Rashid et al. (2010) may be misspecified, 
as it leaves out some important variables such as retained earnings and R&D expenditure, and 
that this will result in omitted variable bias (p. 104). Further, he suggests that the explanators 
used only capture the managerial aspects of the firm, and ignore demand-supply, innovation and 
technological aspects which also contribute to profit (Chowdhury 2010, p.105).  
The authors acknowledge these points. In any linear regression model, many variables 
may be included. However, any study must put a limit to the number of variables, and make 
choices as to their relevance. There is inevitably inherent bias as not all explanatory variables are 
known or can be incorporated. The authors chose the explanatory variables based upon those 
identified in the findings of previous literature (Rashid et al. 2010, pp.84-85). The authors’ aim 
was to limit the independent variables within the corporate governance attributes, subject to 
availability of data. For example, while R&D is a recognised explanatory variable, many listed 
firms in Bangladesh do not appropriately disclose R&D expenditure in their disclosure 
documents, despite adopting a process of convergence with international accounting standards in 
1999 (see for example Mir & Rahman 2005).  
Chowdhury (2010) suggests the Hausman test or Ramsy's RESET (Regression 
Specification Error Test) be run (p.108) to justify the appropriateness of the variables in the 
model. The authors conducted the Ramsay's RESET by using E-Views to determine if additional 
variables could be fitted within the regression model (see Table 1). The results suggest while 
additional variables could be fitted within the Tobin’s Q model, this is not so for the ROA 
model. It is worthy to note that Ramsay's RESET does not suggest which variable(s) should be 
included and the inclusion of another variable into the model may even increase the bias.  
Acknowledging these limitations, we also conducted the 'omitted variable-likelihood 
ratio' test to determine whether the omitted variables ‘retained profit’ (as suggested by 
Chowdhury 2010), ‘firms growth’ and ‘firms risk’ (measured as Standard Deviation of 
movement of stock price per month or stock price volatility) play an important role in the Rashid 
et al. (2010) model. From the results of the test in Table 1, the authors notice that, except for risk 
in ROA model, inclusion of all of these variables did not play an important role in either of the 
models. Asteriou and Hall (2007, p.344) while mentioning the advantages of ‘panel data’ noted 
that, "the basic idea behind panel data analysis comes from the notion that the individual 
relationship will all have same parameters. This is sometimes known as pooling assumptions". 
They maintain that, if the pooling assumption is correct, the problem of omitted variables which 
may cause biased estimates in a single individual regression may not occur in a panel context. 
Because we have already conducted Ramsey's RESET and 'omitted variable-likelihood ratio', the 
CUSUM and CUSUM Square Test would be repetition and thus are not conducted. The 
preference for a dynamic model is contestable. 
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Table 1 
Diagnostics 
 Model F-Statistics P- Value  
Ramsey RESET ROA 1.5227 0.2183  
 Tobin’s Q 9.8009 0.0000 *** 
Ramsey RESET ROA 9.865109 0.0019  
[after including Growth, Risk, and Retained Profit] Tobin’s Q 18.4319 0.0000 *** 
Omitted Variable-likelihood Ratio (Growth) ROA 0.040859 0.8400  
 Tobin’s Q 0.029430 0.8639 *** 
Omitted Variable-likelihood Ratio (Risk) ROA 20.07498 0.0000 *** 
 Tobin’s Q 39.62854 0.0000 *** 
Omitted Variable-likelihood Ratio (Retained Profit) ROA 2.237619 0.1359  
 Tobin’s Q 48.03429 0.0000 *** 
     * p  0.10; ** p  0.010; *** p  0.001. 
 
Relationship between Firm Age and Performance 
Chowdhury (2010) questions the inclusion of firm age as a control variable within Rashid et al.’s 
(2010) model, arguing a “a non-monotonic relationship is implied between age of the firm and 
firm’s profitability” (p.105); “it may be misleading to relate profitability with the age of the 
firm” arguing that “older firms suffer from inertia and a failure to innovate and thus they 
degenerate into oblivion” (p.106). He further argues that the “over-concentration of family 
ownership control is the surest sign of a non-monotonic relationship between firm-age and 
profitability. For instance, the death of a family patriarch and/or falling-out among feuding 
family members often leads to disintegration within the firm management and adversely affects 
the profitability and viability of the firm” (pp.105-106). He subsequently mentions the examples 
of Quasem Group of Companies, Ilias Brothers and the Partex Group of firms which experienced 
such a disintegration and/or division.  
The authors note that the relationship between firm age and performance has been clearly 
established in the literature (for example, Ang, Cole & Lin 2000; Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wellset 
1998; Harjoto & Hoje 2008; Loderer & Waelchli 2009; Majumdar & Chhibber 1999; Tian & 
Lau 2001). Because of the possible influences of firm age on firm performance, many of these 
studies have included it as a control variable in their models. In his commentary on the 
relationship between firm age and firm performance, Chowdhury neglects to not distinguish 
between different corporate forms. Chowdhury’s (2010) arguments are based upon Private 
Limited Companies (which are not listed on any stock exchanges) and as such have a 
fundamentally different governance structure and legal requirements to the firms included in the 
Rashid et al. study, which is based on public limited companies listed on Bangladesh stock 
exchanges. Private Limited Companies are not required to appoint outside independent directors, 
while publically listed companies are required to have outside independent directors. These 
companies have a formal accountability structure (have a formal board and management), hold 
annual general meetings, and prepare disclosure documents (subject to financial audit and 
scrutinised by the regulatory body Securities and Exchange Commission Bangladesh). A listed 
company and a private company have different ownership and oversight and an equivalent non-
monotonic relationship cannot be inferred. Furthermore, the minimum firm age in Rashid et al. 
(2010) is 8 years (antilog of 2.079 from minimum LOGAGE in the descriptive statistics in p. 
86). This indicates our sample firms have survived competition. There is insufficient evidence to 
support Chowdhury’s (2010) argument for the impact of rent extraction. Even if rent extraction 
AABFJ  |  Volume 6, no. 3, 2012 
 
125 
 
by newer firms from older firms was occurring, the authors argue it cannot be inferred that there 
is no relationship between firm age and performance.  
 We have not provided the theoretical or statistical justification for transforming some 
variables into logarithms. We have done so to neutralise the variability in data and we have not 
provided the explanation as we assumed that readers will be aware of such practice. Rashid et 
al.’s (2010) results are presented in Table 5 of that paper.  
 
Composition of Error Term 
Chowdhury (2010) questions how homogeneity and independence are possible for firms in 
different industry groups in the sample (p.106). We have acknowledged this limitation within our 
paper (Rashid et al. 2010, p.89). In this regard we again quote from Asteriou and Hall (2007): 
 
The basic idea behind panel data analysis comes from the notion that the individual relationship 
will all have same parameters. This is sometimes known as pooling assumptions as we are in 
effect pooling all the individual together into one dataset and imposing a common set of 
parameters across them (Asteriou & Hall, p.344). 
 
They further maintain that, if the pooling assumption is not correct, the panel is often 
referred to as a heterogeneous panel (as the parameters are different across the individuals). Even 
if this is the case, (except certain circumstances) it is normally expected that the panel data 
estimator will give some representative estimate of the individual parameters. The only problem 
we have in our data is the violation of pooling assumptions, as we have used an unbalanced panel 
(as there are not 90 firms in all years) that may lead to 'unobserved heterogeneity'. 
In response to the reviewer regarding the issue of variation across the firms and within a 
firm (or firm specific characteristics) the authors carried out further analysis using a panel data 
model. First, a Hausman Specification Test using E-Views was done to test the significance of 
the difference between the fixed effect estimates and the random effect estimates. The Chi 
Square (2) statistics and corresponding p-values of both the ROA and Tobin's Q model rejects 
the null hypothesis that random effects are consistent (see Table 2). As such the authors have 
now run the regression with a 'fixed effect model' (to capture the firm specific characteristics) 
under both ROA and Tobin’s Q models. The results of the ROA model are consistent with the 
conclusion of the Rashid et al. (2010) paper, that is, there is no significant relationship between 
board composition and firm economic performance in Bangladesh. However, the results of the 
Tobin’s Q model in this test show that there is a significant negative relationship between board 
composition and firm performance. This additional analysis strengthens our original finding that 
independent directors do not add potential economic value, by now suggesting that independent 
directors may even reduce potential economic value to firms in Bangladesh. 
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Table 2 
Board composition and firm performance 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
(Before capturing firm specific 
characteristics) 
Dependent Variables 
(After capturing firm specific 
characteristics) 
(a) ROA (b) Tobin's Q (a) ROA (b) Tobin's Q 
Intercept 
-0.078 
(-1.061) 
 
-1.798 
(-5.855) 
*** 
-0.206 
(-0.602)  
-7.896 
(-7.646) 
*** 
BDCOMP 
0.144 
(1.560) 
 
0.418 
(1.088) 
 
-0.152 
(-0.890)  
-1.195 
(-2.312) 
** 
DIROWN 
0.039 
(1.087) 
 
0.020 
(0.132) 
 
0.154 
(0.723)  
-0.451 
(-0.701)  
LOGBDSIZE 
-0.042 
(-1.724) 
* 
0.384 
(3.765) 
*** 
0.014 
(0.204)  
0.286 
(1.345)  
CEOD 
0.011 
(0.757) 
 
-0.110 
(-1.842) 
* 
-0.026 
(-0.672)  
0.035 
(0.301)  
DEBT 
-0.080 
(-6.356) 
*** 
0.886 
(16.966) 
*** 
-0.103 
(-3.417) 
*** 
1.123 
(12.346) 
*** 
LOGSIZE 
0.020 
(6.237) 
*** 
0.049 
(3.731) 
*** 
-0.027 
(-2.922) 
** 
0.024 
(0.888)  
LOGAGE 
0.045 
(1.934) 
* 
0.492 
(5.096) 
*** 
0.148 
(1.283)  
2.785 
(8.000) 
*** 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.302  0.586  0.585  0.888  
F-Statistic 
 
17.468 *** 54.887 *** 5.000 *** 23.554 *** 
Hausman Test ( 2 )     27.3409  48.1144  
P-value     0.0003 *** 0.0000 *** 
 
This table presents the summary results of the board composition and firm performance under different performance 
measures. Column (a) and (b) represent the coefficients of performance measures. The t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. 
* p  0.10; ** p  0.010; *** p  0.001. 
 
Sample Period  
Chowdhury (2010, p.107) questions the inclusion of the years 2007 and 2008 in our sample. He 
identifies them as being ‘abnormal’ years for the Bangladesh economy and politics, because in 
2007 there was both a Bangladesh military coup which established a military-backed caretaker 
government, and a severe flood followed by the devastating cyclone Sidr. 
 The authors are perplexed as to why Chowdhury identifies these factors as significant, 
but then provides contradictory evidence to this argument in his selection of a quotation from the 
Ministry of Finance Bangladesh (2009) which states “The economy of Bangladesh continue[s] to 
demonstrate considerable resilience during FY 2008-09 despite the twin shocks arising from 
global recessions and the adverse effects of the consecutive floods and the cyclone-Sidr” (as 
cited in Chowdhury 2010 p.107). Floods and cyclones are very common in Bangladesh, and it is 
questionable whether such natural disasters have an abnormal impact on overall business 
activity. Furthermore, while Chowdhury (2010 p.107) contends “business confidence was low 
and many businessmen ‘sat on their hands’ until the term of the caretaker government was over” 
he offers no evidence supporting his conclusion that business activity was in the doldrums. 
Indeed, this observation also is directly contradictory to evidence he later quotes referring to the 
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FY 2008-09 “The economy is estimated to have grown at a rate of 5.9 percent, slightly below the 
growth rate (6.2 percent) of FY2007-08”. The two performance indicators (sales and Tobin’s Q) 
of the sample firms over 2008-09 also indicate that the overall performance is not abnormally 
low during the “abnormal” 2007-08 period. Refer Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1 
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Institutional context is pivotal to the variables and sample size selected. Mandatory 
corporate governance disclosures were introduced in 2006 by Securities and Exchange 
Commission Bangladesh. A period of 2005-09 was selected for this study to capture the possible 
impact over the period of this specific regulatory change. This point was missed by the 
commentator. 
Chowdhury (2010) argues that the Corporate Governance Notification 2006 (CGN) for 
the appointment of outside independent directors was issued on 20 January 2006 and its effect 
will only be known after a lag. In the Rashid et al. (2010) sample, 10 firms have outside directors 
even before the CGN 2006 was issued. All other firms in the sample acknowledged their 
obligation, which is evident from their disclosure documents by their respective year end. It is 
contended the period is sufficient to capture any lag. The firms whose financial years end on 30 
June had almost 6 months lag, while the firms whose years end on 31 December had almost one 
year lag. Furthermore, although the condition of such appointment was not mandatory, non-
compliance requires mandatory disclosure in the Director’s Report as per schedule 5.00 of the 
CGN 2006, by order of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Bangladesh. 
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Results 
Chowdhury (2010, p.108) contends an emphasis is placed on the statistical significance of the 
coefficient in arriving at the conclusions, while ignoring its magnitude. The study found the 
coefficient BDCOMP was positive but not statistically significant. Contrary to Chowdhury 
positing that “the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of BDCOMP is substantial (0.144 and 
0.418 respectively)”, the impact of an increase in this variable on firm performance is minute (an 
increase of 0.118 (one standard deviation) in this variable is associated with mere 0.0118 
increase in ROA and 0.0343 on Tobin’s Q). Therefore, the coefficient of BDCOMP in our results 
is neither statistically significant (i.e. does not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that there 
is a relationship between board composition and firm performance) nor practically significant.    
 
Table 3: Board composition and firm performance under different performance measures  
 
 
Dependent Variables 
(Before correcting for 
heteroscedasticity) 
Dependent Variables 
(After correcting for 
heteroscedasticity) 
(a) ROA (b) Tobin's Q (a) ROA (b) Tobin's Q 
Intercept 
-0.078 
(-1.061) 
 
-1.798 
(-5.855) 
*** -0.102 
(-1.070)  
-1.824 
(-6.265) 
*** 
BDCOMP 
0.144 
(1.560) 
 
0.418 
(1.088) 
 
0.146 
(1.883) * 
0.414 
(1.306) 
 
DIROWN 
0.039 
(1.087) 
 
0.020 
(0.132) 
 
0.031 
(0.798)  
0.008 
(0.048) 
 
LOGBDSIZE 
-0.042 
(-1.724) 
* 
0.384 
(3.765) 
*** 
-0.029 
(-0.829)  
0.415 
(4.301) 
*** 
CEOD 
0.011 
(0.757) 
 
-0.110 
(-1.842) 
* 
0.008 
(0.689)  
-0.117 
(-2.187) 
** 
DEBT 
-0.080 
(-6.356) 
*** 
0.886 
(16.966) 
*** 
-0.065 
(-1.285)  
0.914 
(21.396) 
*** 
LOGSIZE 
0.020 
(6.237) 
*** 
0.049 
(3.731) 
*** 
0.018 
(5.884) *** 
0.046 
(3.882) 
*** 
LOGAGE 
0.045 
(1.934) 
* 
0.492 
(5.096) 
*** 
0.046 
(2.795) ** 
0.483 
(4.460) 
*** 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.302  0.586  0.286  0.641  
F-Statistic 
 
17.468 *** 54.887 *** 16.636 *** 70.761 *** 
 
This table presents the summary results of the board composition and firm performance under different performance 
measures. Column (a) and (b) represent the coefficients of performance measures. The t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. 
* p  0.10; ** p  0.010; *** p  0.001. 
Chowdhury (2010) also suggests running a diagnostic test for heteroskedasticity, and a 
Jarque-Bera Test for normality. A Breusch–Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) test was conducted through E-
Views. This test confirms the presence of heteroscedasticity. It is noted that heteroscedasticity is 
very common in panel data (Asteriou & Hall 2007). Wrigley (1977 p.13) states 
“heteroscedasticity does not result in biased parameter estimates, but it does result in a loss of 
efficiency”. Despite heteroscedasticity, OLS estimators are linear, unbiased and are (under 
general conditions) in large samples, normally distributed (Gujarati 2003, p.427). It is argued 
that "heteroscedasticity has never been a reason to throw out an otherwise good model" (Mankiw 
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1990, p.1648); "unequal error variance is worth correcting only when the problem is severe" 
(Fox 1997, p.306); and "unless heteroscedasticity is very severe, one may not abandon OLS in 
favour of GLS or WLS" (Gujarati 2003, p.400). Despite these considerations, we ran the 
regressions by using the correction techniques of White (1980) for unknown heteroscedasticity. 
The results show a change for the ROA performance measure, significant only at the 10% level. 
Refer to Table 3 above. 
The normality assumption requires that observations should be normally distributed in 
the population. Coakes and Steed (2001) argue that the violations of this assumption are of little 
concern, when the sample size is large (greater than 30). There were 90 firms in the sample and 
the assumption of normality is confirmed through a Normal Q-Q Plot. The Residual 
Test/Histogram-Normality Test of all equations produced a 'bell shape'. Normality was also 
checked by using Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests. Both tests do not reject the null 
hypothesis of normality (at p 0.001). Also carried out was the Jarque-Bera test (Table 4), using 
E-Views. It also does not reject the null hypothesis of normality (as p 0.001 in most cases). 
 
Table 4  
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
Probability 
ROA 0.057 -1.494 0.287 0.132 -6.278 69.833  55270.08  0.000 
Tobin’s Q 1.290 0.335 6.226 0.769 2.566 9.873  1372.42  0.000 
BDCOMP 0.109 0.000 0.333 0.082 -0.077 -0.751  8.126  0.017 
DIROWN 0.423 0.000 0.960 0.190 0.069 0.423  2.065  0.356 
LOGBDSIZE 1.857 1.099 2.485 0.304 -0.269 -0.102  3.530  0.171 
CEOD 0.416 0.000 1.000 0.494 0.344 -1.896  45.921  0.000 
DEBT 0.774 0.073 5.619 0.629 4.061 22.483  6266.395  0.000 
SIZE 5.459 -4.200 10.724 2.398 -0.937 1.132  53.172  0.000 
AGE 2.858 2.079 3.466 0.312 -0.082 -0.836  8.686  0.012 
 
Although it is not mentioned in Chowdhury (2010), we would like to address the possible 
presence of endogeneity (the relationship between the independent variable with the error term) 
in our model. In the presence of endogeneity OLS estimates can be biased and inconsistent. 
While the endogeneity is an important factor, it is not fatal in doing empirical corporate 
governance research (Denis 2001, p.198). Despite this consideration, we have checked the 
possible presence of endogeneity in our model by carrying out a Hausman test. The output of the 
Hausman test suggests that both the OLS and TSLS are consistent.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Rashid et al. (2010, p.88) concluded that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between board composition in the form of representation of outside independent directors and 
firm performance, implying that the outside independent directors did not add potential 
economic value to firms in Bangladesh. This conclusion is based upon the results shown in Table 
5 (p.88). Although the BDCOMP coefficient found in Rashid et al. (2010) is not statistically 
significant, its positive sign is consistent with the literature presented (pp.77-82) which 
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demonstrates independent directors positively contribute to performance through good 
monitoring of management.  
Chowdhury (2010, p.108) argued that “I am not sure how the authors can claim that 
external independent directors are ‘good monitors’ as this has not been tested in this paper”. 
However, in referring to our results he states “design of the β1 is POSITIVE indicating the 
independent directors’ positive contribution to profitability; however, this substantial positive 
contribution of independent directors is rejected by the authors on the grounds of its statistical 
significance”. In Chowdhury’s own admission, we have tested the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance, a well recognised indicator of good monitoring in corporate 
governance literature (Bathala & Rao 1995; Kaymak & Bektas 2008; Luan & Tang 2007; 
Nicholson & Kiel 2007; Zahra & Pearce II 1989).  
While acknowledging the potential contribution of a “properly specified econometric 
model” (Chowdhury 2010, p.108), the authors contend studies in the accounting discipline are 
artefacts of temporal contextual and social processes (Hines 1988). Acknowledging the 
limitations of a modelling tool, the authors see the contribution of this study as an exploration of 
the circumstance of a developing economy. In a practical sense generalisability in the form of a 
specified model is neither sought nor possible.  
Based on the above analytical presentation, we question the strengths of Chowdhury’s 
(2010) criticisms and argue that the factors discussed in Chowdhury (2010) do not necessarily 
impair the outcome of the Rashid et al. (2010) paper. This study seeks to contribute to the 
increasing literature by recognising the interests of readers in gaining more insight and 
understanding of empirical corporate governance research, with special reference to the 
Bangladesh context.  
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